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USER-GENERATED CONTENT AND THE FUTURE
OF COPYRIGHT: PART TWO-AGREEMENTS
BETWEEN USERS AND MEGA-SITES
Steven Hetchert
Abstract
This article examines issues surrounding the ownership of user
generated content (UGC). In particular, it examines the contractual
relationships that exist between the creators of UGC and the mega-
sites that host the content. Furthermore, this article argues that many
contracts, particularly those between minors and UGC mega-sites,
are unconscionable and thus invalid on their terms. This means that
these mega-sites are infringers on the copyright protected creative
output of large numbers of their users.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This is the second article in a series of three articles about user-
generated content (UGC) and its importance to the future of
copyright. The first article looked at foundational ownership issues
regarding UGC.' Having settled some basic issues pertaining to initial
investiture and ownership, the present article can proceed in a logical
manner to the next set of issues that arise-those dealing with
contractual exchange or alienation of this intellectual property. One
thing that different forms of property have in common-be they
physical or virtual-is that until there is investiture, there will be no
ownership of property such as to allow for transactions. The sequel to
the present article will take the analysis of the private law side of
UGC to its logical conclusion by examining the core tort issues
pertaining to UGC.
The previous article considered ownership issues pertaining
directly to the creation of UGC. We saw that in the simplest type of
situation, a user-generated work will be owned by the user who
created it, but that complications arise for the sorts of UGC that may
have features that potentially require such works to be characterized
as joint works, compilations, collective works, or works for hire.2 We
saw that not only is much UGC copyrightable and hence capable of
being owned in copyright, but that it may be valuable in the economic
sense that viable business models may be created to monetize it.
3
Such monetization is bound to involve exchange relationships for the
obvious yet fundamental economic reason that not all UGC will be in
the hands of those who most value it in virtue of the set of
entitlements that emerge through initial investiture.
This is of course not to say that all such property will come
through commercial means into the hands of those who value it but
who currently lack legal entitlements to it. For the narrowly self-
interested rational actors presumed by conventional economic
analysis, there are always alternatives to obtaining property through
either creative means-such as initial investiture, as examined in the
prequel to this article-or legal means-such as exchange via
contract, as examined here. Those alternative means involve tort and
crime; that is, one may gain access to creative content through civil or
1. See Steven Hetcher, User-Generated Content and the Future of Copyright: Part One,
Investiture of Ownership, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. (forthcoming 2008).
2. Id.
3. Id.
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criminal infringement, or to use the word that encompasses both
categories, piracy.4 Torts and crimes in an offline world often occur
between strangers-albeit strangers at arm's length in the literal
rather than metaphorical/legal sense of that term. So too, copyright
infringement in an online world often, perhaps predominantly, occurs
among strangers. Most notably, the billions of songs that have been
illegally downloaded in recent years have typically involved piracy
among parties who are, legally-speaking, third-parties to one another.
When it comes to UGC, however, torts and crimes tend to occur
between parties who are not third-parties, but rather who exist in a
contractual relationship with one another. This is another reason for
examining the contractual relationships that occur in relation to UGC
prior to examining the tort and criminal relationships. Since the torts
and crimes occur in the context of pre-existing contractual
relationships, the injurious activities can only be fully understood
when these relationships are taken into account; after all, prior
understandings codified in the contract regarding expected behavior
may have an important impact on the types of behavior that are
permissible between the parties. It is also fitting to look at contract
first as more basic given that, if one accepts the rule of law as a
grundnorm, contract is more central in the sense that once an
individual has ownership, others can contract with this individual
while maintaining the civil order, and more broadly, the social order;
whereas with torts and crimes, something has gone wrong, someone
has been wronged. 5 Another way to think about this is that a world
consisting solely of property and contract is preferable to a world
consisting solely of property and torts or property and crime. Contract
is in this normative sense prior to tort and crime, just as property was
seen to be logically prior to contract.
Exploring the largely unexplored terrain of the contractual side
of issues that arise pertaining to UGC is of interest for academic
4. The fact that UGC involves everyday users uploading creative content for the world
to see has quickly raised the specter of other sorts of injuries as well. One concern is privacy and
its continued diminution in a digital environment. Another type of harm to rear its ugly head in
this new context is that of defamation. It does not gainsay the importance of these topics to note
that in the present context of user-generated content, a type of intellectual property, these other
concerns will only be touched upon to the extent they arise in the context of UGC.
5. It is worth noting that this claim would not hold true on an economic model. For
economists, there are no intrinsic wrongs definable outside the instrumentalist logic of the
welfarist desiderata. In other words, just as there may be efficient breach in contract, there may
be efficient tort and efficient crime. Thus, for the economist, the rule of law is merely a rule of
thumb. Accordingly, doing right, in the sense of maximizing expected social welfare, may entail
committing a crime or a tort and, conversely, acting legally may entail committing a wrong.
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reasons, but I will argue that this exploration brings us to a startling
practical finding; namely that millions upon millions of such
agreements-particularly those between UGC mega-sites and
minors-are unconscionable and therefore invalid on their terms.
Since the agreements are invalid, the copying by UGC mega-sites of
users' content- is an infringement. These claims will be developed in
Part III. Part II will first examine a few of the small number of cases
that have emerged thus far dealing with users and their agreements
with the UGC mega-sites. Special attention will be paid to Facebook,
as it is one of the fastest growing and dominant sites that engages in
particularly problematic behavior. As an examination of the cases will
demonstrate, the agreements that prove to be of legal significance turn
out to be both written and oral. I will argue that we should also utilize
the concept of implied agreements as part of a proposed solution to
the difficulties encountered in Part III.
II. AGREEMENTS BETWEEN USERS AND UGC MEGA-SITES
It is worth noting at the outset that to refer to "agreements" at all
may be a legal conclusion, given the nature of the interaction between
users and mega-sites. These agreements, to the extent that they are
contained in writings, are clearly contracts of adhesion in the sense
that they are form contracts.6 The more difficult and more important
question is whether they are contracts of adhesion in the more loaded
sense that they are illegitimate and thus either not enforceable or not
fully enforceable. This inquiry is necessary if we are to make further
progress in understanding who owns what when it comes to UGC, as
disputed exchanges inevitably involve ownership claims.
The first case to be discussed, Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc.,
involves a claim arising in the virtual world setting of Second Life.7
For reasons that will become clear, it will make sense to first examine
this case despite the fact that it does not involve UGC but rather
virtual land created by the website itself.8 The second lawsuit
discussed below, Chang v. Virgin Mobile USA, LLC, has recently
been filed against the photo sharing site, Flickr, and the Creative
6. A contract of adhesion is a "standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the
party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to
adhere to the contract or reject it." Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1172 (N.D. Cal.
2002) (quoting Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Serv., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 113 (2000)).
7. Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F.Supp.2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007). For more
information on Second Life, see the Second Life webpage. Second Life, http://secondlife.com
(last visited Apr. 22, 2008).
8. Bragg, 487 F.Supp.2d at 597.
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Commons as a co-defendant. 9 Plaintiffs in this case had the cheek to
personally serve papers on Larry Lessig as representative of the
Creative Commons. 10 The third case that will be discussed is Viacom
v. YouTube."1 In this case, Viacom alleges that YouTube and its
owner, Google, are massive direct and secondary infringers of a
variety of content owned by Viacom and the other defendant. This
case is of great significance to the issue of infringement in the context
of UGC and hence will figure prominently in the third article of this
series. Nevertheless, this case merits brief discussion here as well,
inasmuch as the contractual agreements, or perhaps the lack thereof,
between users and YouTube will be seen to be an important
background consideration upon which the infringement analysis may
properly commence.
A. Bragg v. Linden Labs
Bragg v. Linden Labs is a case about one type of virtual
property-virtual real estate. This term is not exactly self-
explanatory, given that real estate-by definition-seems to be
contrasted with virtual. Virtual real estate is like real estate in many
crucial respects. In the present context, the real estate at issue exists in
the persistent virtual world named Second Life, which is owned and
operated by Linden Labs, a private company located in California.'
2
In this virtual world, real estate functions like it does in the actual
world in many respects. One can buy it and sell it and use it as a
foundation for the standard sorts of structures such as houses and
commercial buildings, and non-habitable structures such as fences or
carports.
13
However, real estate in Second Life has some important features
distinguishing it from traditional real property, the most obvious of
which is that, at the physical level, it exists as Is and Os rather than as
9. Chang v. Virgin Mobile USA, LLC, No. 3:07-cv-01767 , (N.D. Tex. Filed Oct. 19,
2007).
10. Noam Cohen, Use My Photo? Not Without Permission, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2007, at
C3.
11. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages, Viacom Int'l Inc. v.
YouTube, Inc., No. 07-cv-2103 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
12. See Linden Lab, http://Iindenlab.com/ (last visited April 20, 2008).
13. Bragg, 487 F.Supp.2d at 596:
We believe our new policy recognizes the fact that persistent world users are
making significant contributions to building these worlds and should be able to
both own the content they create and share in the value that is created. The
preservation of users' property rights is a necessary step toward the emergence of
genuinely real online worlds.
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a composite of minerals, decomposing organic matter, timber,
shingles and the like. 14 This is an essential difference. Other
differences are significant yet contingent. For example, all land in
Second Life is owned initially by Linden Labs. This has no direct
parallel in the domestic property law, as many fee simples were
already in private hands at the formation of the U.S. Republic. It is
plausible to think that a reasonable person in Bragg's shoes would
implicitly think that she held the virtual equivalent of a fee simple,
given that the site promises her ownership of property and does not go
on to say that this property is unlike the usual sort of property that
users are accustomed to, apart from its virtual nature of course.
However, just because property is virtual does not mean it cannot be
held in fee simple; it is just that it would be held in the virtual analog
of fee simple. In other words, one would possess the usual bundle of
sticks of property rights that one learns about in first-year property
class.
In Bragg, Plaintiff bought a few parcels of land. The dispute
arose in particular with regard to a parcel named "Taessot," which
Bragg purchased for $300.15 Linden apparently found some behavior
of Bragg's to be untoward, and Linden basically kicked Bragg off its
site for a claimed violation of its policies.1 6 There is no exact parallel
between what Linden Labs did and what can be done with respect to
real property. De-activating Bragg's account had the effect that he
could not access his property. Such summary taking of Bragg's real
property without legal process is plausibly seen as contrary to what
Bragg reasonably thought he owned.
Bragg argued that he relied on Linden's efforts to induce him
into believing he would own property. 17 Due to hundreds of years of
14. The court appears to assume that because the dispute arises in a digital realm that
accordingly the property in dispute is hence intellectual property. Id. at 595. ("In November
2003, Linden announced that it would recognize participants' full intellectual property
protection for the digital content they created or otherwise owned in Second Life."). While this
is not the venue to explore the nature of virtual property, it should be noted that, primafacie, the
property at issue functions more like a virtual analog of real property rather than copyrighted
creative content. We are only in the initial stages of understanding the nature of property and
other interests such as rights of personality that are beginning to emerge in virtual worlds. See
generally Woodrow Barfield, Intellectual Property Rights in Virtual Environments: Considering
the Rights of Owners, Programmers and Virtual Avatars, 39 AKRON L. REV. 649 (2006).
15. Bragg, 487 F.Supp.2d at 597.
16. Id. ("Linden sent Bragg an email advising him that Taessot had been improperly
purchased through an 'exploit.' Linden took Taesot [sic] away. It then froze Bragg's account,
effectively confiscating all of the virtual property and currency that he maintained on his
account with Second Life.").
17. Id. at 598:
2008] AGREEMENTS BETWEEN USERS AND MEGA-SITES 835
practice and legal decision, it is reasonable that Bragg understood the
word "property" as the term is used in ordinary language and life,
outside of the context of the setting of a particular virtual world such
as Second Life. In particular, it is common understanding that if one
owns property, another cannot simply take it away without legal
process. 18 Even if one's property is subject to a. lien or mortgage and
one is not living up to one's obligations under the agreement, the
other party cannot simply show up and physically remove the
occupant from the property.' 9 Instead, one must invoke the legal
system.
Linden Labs can respond that there are no courts in Second Life
to provide such legal process. The owners of Second Life are the
lords of their domain and they explicitly state in the Terms of Use that
they can deactivate users for any reason or no reason.20 However,
Bragg has two compelling responses to Linden Labs on this point.
First, Linden Labs should not promiscuously tell users that they can
own property if the property they are capable of owning does not have
the features of property that one can reasonably expect. Importantly,
Linden could have easily qualified its promise of ownership by
explaining that the ownership it promises is unlike the usual sort of
ownership in important ways that disadvantage the user. Most
important, Linden should have informed potential owners that the real
estate they purchase with real U.S. dollars (as exchanged for Linden
dollars) can be taken away at Linden's discretion and the so-called
owner will have no avenue of redress. 21 The fact that Linden did not
seek to explain this crucial difference can only be seen as an attempt
In support of the Court's exercising personal jurisdiction over Rosedale,
Bragg relies on various representations that Rosedale personally made in the
media "to a national audience" regarding ownership of virtual property in Second
Life. Bragg maintains that Rosedale made these representations to induce Second
Life participants to purchase virtual property and that such representations in fact
induced Bragg to do so. Bragg also relies on the fact that he "attended" town hall
meetings hosted in Second Life where he listened to Rosedale make statements
about the purchase of virtual land.
18. Ownership of property implies "the right to possess, to enjoy the income from, to
alienate, or to recover ownership from one who has improperly obtained title" 63 AM. JUR. 2D
Property § 1 (1997).
19. See, e.g., 55 AM. JUR. 2D Mortgages § 513 (2007) (describing the legal process for
foreclosure).
20. Bragg, 487 F.Supp.2d at 608 (noting that the Terms of Service state, "Linden has the
right at any time for any reason or no reason to suspend or terminate your Account, terminate
this Agreement, and/or refuse any and all current or future use of the Service without notice or
liability to you.").
21. Id. at 595-96 n.5.
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on its part to deceive the user into thinking that the user was entitled
to true ownership of property when in fact he was conferred some
lesser interest.
Second and more decisive, Linden Labs made representations
outside of the contract that promised property in an unqualified sense
of the term.22 Thus, the four corners of the contract did not control the
legal outcome. Even if Linden could plausibly argue that the user took
the property as promised in the Terms of Service subject to the term
that made cancellation at Linden's discretion, the representations
outside of the written contract between the parties did not come
qualified in this manner and hence could reasonably be understood by
the potential owner as conveying the analog of a fee simple. It is
partly based on these representations outside of the Terms of Service
that plaintiff alleged, inter alia, fraud, conversion, and breach of
contract.23
Sadly for those who wish for case law guidance pertaining to
virtual worlds, the court did not reach the substance of Bragg's
charges. Instead, the case turns on the purported unconscionability of
Linden Lab's choice of law provisions, arbitration provisions, and its
forum selection clause. 4 Nevertheless, the court made it clear that it
took Bragg's grievance seriously. Bragg contended that key terms of
the agreement proffered by Linden Labs were unconscionable. The
court found much to quibble with in these terms. In particular, the
court focused on the fact that there was surprise due to hidden or
missing terms because there was no notice of the serious expense and
inconvenience to the plaintiff having to spend ten to twenty thousand
dollars to pay the arbitrators in addition to having to go to California
from Pennsylvania in order to take part in the arbitration.26 In essence,
the court said that the terms left plaintiff with no effective remedy. 7
22. Id. at 596 ("Rosedale recently gave an extended interview for Inc. magazine, where
he appeared on the cover stating, 'What you have in Second Life is real and it is yours. It
doesn't belong to us."'). Land in Second Life also had indicia of typical land ownership such as
the fact that owners were taxed on the land. Id. at 597 n.7.
23. Id. at 597 n.8.
24. Id. at 603.
25. See id. at 602 ("Additionally, Pennsylvania has a substantial interest in protecting its
residents from allegedly misleading representations that induce them to purchase virtual
property."); id. at 595 ("Ultimately at issue in this case are the novel questions of what rights
and obligations grow out of the relationship between the owner and creator of a virtual world
and its resident-customers. While the property and the world where it is found are 'virtual' the
dispute is real.").
26. See id at 606-07, 609.
27. Id. at 611:
2008] AGREEMENTS BETWEEN USERS AND MEGA-SITES 837
The court applied California law in its analysis of the contract. It
noted that to find unconscionability in California, it must find both
procedural and substantive unconscionability. 28  It found both
elements and concluded that the arbitration clause was
unconscionable. It remanded to a court in Pennsylvania for further
proceedings in accordance to Bragg's preference and contrary to the
preference of Linden.
29
B. Chang v. Virgin Mobile USA, LLC.
Consider next Flickr, a mega-site built on the advertising-based
business model, in which users post their original photographs to the
site. Flickr offers its users the option to post their content pursuant to
one of the various possible Creative Commons licenses. Despite the
fact that the UGC creator, Justin Ho-Yee Wong, dedicated his work to
the public via a creative commons license, 30 an important copyright
issue arose with regard to Wong's UGC such that he and the subject
of the photograph in question, Susan Chang, are now suing Virgin
Mobile. Chang, a 16-year-old, learned that a photo of her was
appearing on a billboard in Australia promoting Virgin Mobile. This
was done through no fault of her own, without her permission, and
with no benefit to her.
31
This strange situation arose due to the following event: Mr.
Wong, Ms. Chang's youth group counselor, took a picture of Ms.
Chang engaged in horseplay holding up a peace sign during a church
Taken together, the lack of mutuality, the costs of arbitration, the forum selection
clause, and the confidentiality provision that Linden unilaterally imposes through
the TOS [terms of service] demonstrate that the arbitration clause is not designed
to provide Second Life participants an effective means of resolving disputes with
Linden. Rather, it is a one-sided means which tilts unfairly, in almost all
situations, in Linden's favor.
28. Id. at 605 ("The procedural component can be satisfied by showing (1) oppression
through the existence of unequal bargaining positions or (2) surprise through hidden terms
common in the context of adhesion contracts. The substantive component can be satisfied by
showing overly harsh or one-sided results that 'shock the conscience."' (citing Comb v. PayPal,
Inc., 218 F.Supp.2d 1165, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2002))); id. at 606 ("[T]he critical factor in
procedural unconscionability analysis is the manner in which the contract of the disputed clause
was presented and negotiated." (citing Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1282 (9th
Cir. 2006))); id ("When the weaker party is presented the clause and told to 'take it or leave it'
without the opportunity for meaningful negotiation, oppression, and therefore procedural
unconscionability, are present." (citing Nagrampa, 469 F.3d at 1282)).
29. Id. at 611 ("Finding that the arbitration clause is procedurally and substantively
unconscionable, the Court will refuse to enforce it.").
30. See generally Monica Hesse, Hey, Isn't That..., WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2008, at CI.
31. Plaintiff's First Amended Petition at 13, Chang v. Virgin Mobile USA, LLC, No.
3:07-cv-01767 (N.D. Tex. filed Nov. 11,2007).
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fundraiser. The photographer, an avid poster to Flickr, posted the
photo there, where it joined thousands of others he had previously
posted. Wong chose the Creative Commons license whereby the
photo could be used for any means-including commercial means-
so long as the work was attributed to the photographer.3 2 The
telephone company Virgin Australia found the picture online and took
advantage of the photographer's permission to use the photo on a
billboard, but Virgin Australia did so without acknowledging the
source and contrary to Wong's reservation of an attribution right.
In the Complaint, Chang alleged that the billboard casts her in a
negative light because beneath her photo is the caption, "DUMP
YOUR PEN FRIEND., 33 The Complaint alleges that the photo has
caused the girl to "suffer humiliation, severe embarrassment,
frustration, grief, and general mental anguish damages, all of which,
in reasonable probability, will subsist in the future. 34 Chang might
have sued Wong since he posted the photograph without her
permission. There are obvious reasons, however, why one might
hesitate to sue one's youth counselor for an innocent act that had
unfortunate consequences. In addition, Mr. Wong is presumably
comparably impecunious, at least in comparison to Virgin Mobile.
And on the merits, Virgin Mobile is the proximate bad actor, while
Wong, although negligent to be sure, obtained no benefit and indeed
purports to have suffered injury himself, in that Virgin did not credit
Wong with the photograph in violation of his copyright under the
Creative Commons license.35 Presumably he will suffer harm to his
reputation as well, for surely it cannot be a youth counselor's best day
on the job when he inadvertently takes an action that results in one of
his charges being the subject of ridicule and embarrassment half a
world away and even in the halls of her own school.
Together, plaintiffs allege an impressive list of charges: Invasion
of Privacy, Libel Per Se, Libel Per Quad, Breach of Contract,
Negligence, and Copyright Infringement.36 The charges of interest in
the present context are the last three. The negligence allegation
pertains to defendant Creative Commons. Plaintiffs allege that the
Creative Commons was negligent in the manner in which it set up and
administers the Creative Commons licenses and that this negligence
32. Id. 1 37; see also Cohen, supra note 10.
33. Plaintiff's First Amended Petition, supra note 31, 13.
34. Id. 19.
35. Id. 1137-39.
36. Id. 11 16-39.
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was the proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries. 37 This is of interest for
the study of UGC generally, since Flickr is not the only UGC mega-
site to utilize Creative Commons licenses. Thus, if the Creative
Commons is found negligent in this case, it is clearly vulnerable in
other future settings, given that Creative Commons took no special
actions in connection to plaintiffs. In fact, if the Creative Commons is
negligent here, then it will be vulnerable in all circumstances in which
one party posts UGC that incorporates unauthorized creative content.
Given that a number of mega-sites are using Creative Commons
licenses, there may indeed exist a massive number of UGC works
licensed pursuant to a Creative Commons license that may likewise
contain unauthorized content. Below I will discuss one type of
problem that arises from the treatment by certain sites, such as
Facebook, of users' creative content.
C. Viacom v. YouTube
As with Bragg, Viacom v. YouTube 38 might seem at first be a
case with no direct connection to UGC. The reason is that while
Viacom creates a great deal of content, it is professionally-created
content rather than UGC. Viacom is a multinational entertainment
conglomerate owning such venerable properties as MTV, the Daily
Show with Jon Stewart, and Sponge Bob Square Pants.39 In addition,
the Viacom lawsuit seems to have no connection to UGC since it is
directed against defendants who are themselves large corporations.40
This rules out UGC, which by definition does not merely involve
uploading of whole works or large corporations, but rather the actions
of amateurs.4 1
It is not that plaintiffs could not sue creators of UGC if they
chose to-after all, there are a large number of user-generated videos
posted to YouTube that incorporate commercial content controlled by
plaintiffs. One obvious reason not to sue UGC creators is perhaps a
matter of public relations. Viacom might reasonably conclude that it
would be the recipient of bad publicity and customer wrath were it to
sue creators of UGC. Viacom would be within its legal rights to do
so, as unauthorized use is an infringement unless plaintiffs could
37. Id. 34-37
38. Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07-cv-2103 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
39. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages at T 3, Viacom Int'l
Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07-cv-2103 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
40. Plaintiffs allege that defendants are liable as direct infringers and secondary
infringers. Id. 46-89.
41. Hetcher, supra note I (forthcoming 2008).
840 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 24
successfully mount a fair use defense. One response to this possible
reason is that the content industry has demonstrated a willingness to
incur such bad press in as much as it has engaged in suing everyday
consumers by the tens of thousands in the context of file sharing for
the past five years. The content industry has continued to engage in
this legal strategy despite much bad publicity and negative consumer
response.42 But these situations are not as comparable as they might at
first seem. While file sharing is clearly not a fair use, the situation for
UGC is unclear. Certainly, in principle, if cases involving much of
this UGC were litigated, there would likely be many instances in
which the creators would prevail in a fair use argument. Such works
often: (1) are created for purposes of parody or criticism and as such
are protected as a transformative use; (2) are not used pursuant to a
profit motive; (3) involve a small amount of protected material in
comparison to the overall work; and (4) likely do not cause market
harm in most situations, as the UGC works will not serve as
substitutes for the complete works owned by plaintiffs. 43 All of these
factors would count in favor of particular UGC works being found to
44be fair uses.
This point is academic, however, in that it will almost never
make sense for any particular UGC creator to defend herself in a
lawsuit if sued by the owner. Defending copyright infringement
lawsuits is very expensive, and indeed the very fact that the creators
are making no money from their unauthorized copying is all the more
reason that they will have no incentive to mount a fair use defense.
Thus, for the content industry to sue UGC creators would, in all
likelihood, force UGC creators into settlements, which is what has
uniformly been the resolution in the lawsuits against file sharers.45
Thus, the basis for not initiating suit is not a fear that plaintiffs would
not prevail, for in the practical sense they could force individual
creators to settle. Thus, there is likely some other explanation. In fact,
there would appear to be two.
First, even though plaintiffs could force settlements,
nevertheless, in principle, creators will often have a good fair use
42. See, e.g., Sherwin Siy, Unprincipled Principles for User Generated Content (Oct. 18,
2007), http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/1230.
43. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000)
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., John Borland, Napster Reaches Settlement With Publishers, CNET NEWS,
Sept. 24, 2001, http://www.news.com/2100-1023-273394.html; Jeremy W. Peters, Kazaa Said
to Pay $10 Million in Settlement, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 2, 2006, at C6; Jeff Leeds, Grokster Calls it
Quits on Sharing Music Files, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2005, at C1.
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argument in principle.4 6 Thus, to force these putative fair users to
settle would likely incur very bad publicity. This is a key difference
from the situation of file sharers, who were after all guilty of
infringement. File sharers may not like to be sued, but at least they
could not argue that they were being picked on by big companies who
could sue them into expensive settlements despite their probable
innocence as fair users.
Second, another important difference from file sharing is that
with file sharing the actions for everyday users-uploaders and
downloaders-were at the core of the content industry's problems.
These everyday users were involved in unauthorized copying of
literally billions of files. While it was the commercial providers of
software that enabled file sharing-Napster, Aimster, Grokster, etc.-
that bore the brunt of the content industry's legal scorched earth
policy, 47 nevertheless, but for the actions of the millions of individual
uploaders and downloaders, these commercial software providers
would have been harmless. This is not the case, however, with UGC.
The main problem for the content industry is the uploading and
viewing of entire songs or segments of TV shows and movies that can
be uploaded in segments seriatim so as to make complete shows
across a series of files. By contrast, the number of unauthorized uses
that get incorporated into UGC works are relatively small as a
percentage of the totality of unauthorized copying.
48
In Part III, Facebook will be considered in detail. I will argue
that based on the above examination of some of the cases that have
emerged thus far in the context of user-generated content, we are in a
position to draw a very startling conclusion regarding Facebook.
46. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
47. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002); Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
48. 1 would suggest that a norm is beginning to emerge in the entertainment industries
that so-called "cut-and-paste" creative works, as long as non-commercial, are to be tolerated.
Commercial owners will not have the same antipathy toward cut-and-paste creators as these
users are not merely using whole copies for free and thus displacing sales. And further, unlike
say cut-and-paste creators making documentary films, for the typical small-scale, one-off UGC
work, there is less possibility for seeking permission. Many uses will be given privileged
treatment by copyright-enthusiast uses, educational uses, etc. These sorts of uses, per se, are
less likely to irk copyright owners. For example, the music industry appears to tolerate mixtapes,
so long as they do not enter the stream of commerce. Kelefa Sanneh, With Arrest of D.J. Drama,
the Law Takes Aim at Mixtapes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, at E3. See also U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS (2006), http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report-
full.pdf; Exploring the "Fair Use" of Copyrighted Materials on You Tube,
http://www.squidoo.com/bannedbyyoutube (last visited April 20, 2008).
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III. FACEBOOK AS A MASSIVE INFRINGER OF ITS USERS'
COPYRIGHTS
In this Part, I argue that there is good reason to believe that
Facebook is engaged in offering unconscionable contracts to millions
of people, especially to the millions of minors who spend time on the
site. Not only are the contracts unconscionable but they are nullities.
Since they are nullities, the creative content that user's purport to
convey to Facebook is not in fact conveyed, which means that
Facebook is engaging in acts of infringement on a massive scale, due
to its unauthorized copying of UGC. The tables have turned; with
Web 1.0, users massively infringed upon large-scale owners of
copyright, such as the record labels, through online file-sharing
services. Now with Web 2.0, it is the users who are the owners of
creative content and it is the large-scale corporations, the UGC mega-
sites, which are engaged in massive copyright infringement. While I
think this claim may be plausibly made out for a number of the mega-
sites discussed in Part II, the focus here will be on Facebook as it is
the worst offender, given that it has the largest percentage of under-
age users of all the UGC mega-sites.49
A. General Unconscionability of Facebook's Contracts with
Users
Of the various lessons that may be learned by drawing out larger
themes from the few cases involving mega-sites that were discussed
in Part II, the most important one is derived from Bragg v. Linden
Labs.50 The important lesson comes from considering the manner in
which the court in Bragg treats the agreement between Bragg and
Linden Labs. The most obvious lesson of Bragg is that a court that
49. See Paula Lehman, What Facebook Could Learn from Myspace, Bus. Wk. (Oct. 5,
2007), available at
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/oct2007/tc2OO7104-796128.htm?chan=top+
news_top+news+index technology . Things could even be worse, at least from an infringement
standpoint, but for Facebook's elitist and arguably racist policy of seeking to only provide its
service to minors in high school or college. Facebook, Terms of Use,
www.facebook.com/terms.php (last visited Apr. 17, 2008) [hereinafter Facebook] ("This site is
intended solely for users who are thirteen (13) years of age or older, and users of the Site under
18 who are currently in high school or college."). Given the strong positive correlation in this
country between race and social class on the one hand, and social class and educational
attainment on the other hand, Facebook's policy has the effect of skewing its population of faces
away from those of minority groups. See, e.g., Soren Svanum & Robert G. Bringle, Race, Social
Class, and Predictive Bias: An Evaluation Using the WISC, WRAT, and Teacher Ratings, 6
INTELLIGENCE 275 (1982).
50. Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 610 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
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found Second Life's Terms of Use in part unconscionable 5' may do so
as well for other sites with comparable terms. The first consideration
then is whether the UGC mega-sites, such as Facebook, have
comparable terms. We will see that they do, and that in particular,
Facebook does.
With regard to provisions for arbitration, Facebook's terms are
more nuanced than those of Second Life. With regard to non-IP
claims, Facebook's Terms of Use require mandatory arbitration. It
states that: "YOU AND COMPANY AGREE THAT ... THE SOLE
AND EXCLUSIVE FORUM AND REMEDY FOR ANY AND ALL
DISPUTES AND CLAIMS RELATING IN ANY WAY TO OR
ARISING OUT OF THESE TERMS OF USE ... SHALL BE
FINAL AND BINDING ARBITRATION."52
Interestingly, the Terms draw a distinction between intellectual
property and other sorts of rights. After stating the above provision,
the Terms then provide the following exception:
[E]xcept that : (a) to the extent that either use in any manner
infringed upon or violated or threatened to infringe upon or violate
the other party's patent, copyright, trademark or trade secret
rights ... the parties acknowledge that arbitration is not an
adequate remedy at law and that injunctive relief or other
appropriate remedy may be sought.
53
Thus, at least with respect to non-IP claims, Facebook's terms mirror
those of Second Life in mandating binding arbitration.54 These terms
requiring mandatory arbitration in order for users to resolve disputes
may be found unconscionable for the same reasons provided in
Bragg. For instance, there was inadequate notice of the expense
involved in arbitration 55 which, given its relative magnitude and
proportion to the amount at issue in the dispute, would similarly leave
potential Facebook plaintiffs without an effective remedy. 56 In
particular, the value to potential plaintiffs of nullifying these
unconscionable agreements will vary according to the value of
particular plaintiff s creative content. For a large number of plaintiffs,
this value, at least in objective and commercial terms, may be
51. Seeid. at 605-12.
52. Facebook, supra note 49.
53. Id.
54. See Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 603-04 (discussing the Second Life arbitration clause).
55. Id. at 608-10.
56. See Facebook, supra note 49.
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relatively small. Hence, the cost of arbitration will be relatively
significant in proportion to the value of a particular plaintiffs content.
In another respect, however, Facebook's Terms of Use may be
more attractive than those of Second Life, at least facially, as the
Terms of Use provide:
Arbitration under this Agreement shall be conducted by the
American Arbitration Association (the "AAA")... The location of
the arbitration and the allocation of costs and fees for such
arbitration shall be determined in accordance with such AAA
Rules... If such costs are determined to be excessive in a
consumer dispute, the Company will be responsible for paying all
arbitration fees and arbitrator compensation in excess of what is
deemed reasonable.
57
These terms are more user friendly, as they do not attempt to force
potential litigants to pursue their claims in California nor force them
to unavoidably incur significant costs to pursue their claims, as we
saw was the case with Linden Lab's Terms of Service. 8 Instead, the
precise location and costs of arbitration will be up to the discretion of
the AAA.
However, the Bragg court considered not only the presence of
certain terms but also whether terms were buried in the text so as to
cause unfair surprise, and also whether other terms were lacking-
such as terms explaining that the arbitration would entail significant
costs to the potential plaintiff seeking redress.59 Similarly, Facebook's
terms are not set off or highlighted, and similarly, Facebook fails to
inform its bargaining partners of the potentially significant cost of
arbitration, noting merely that if such costs are "excessive," Facebook
will pay without providing any content to the vague term
"excessive." 60 Nevertheless, Facebook's arbitration terms are fairly
seen to be more favorable than those of Second Life in material ways
in that at least if fees are deemed excessive, assuming a reasonable
interpretation, the user will not be on the hook, which is not the case
for Linden Labs.61
In addition to offering more attractive arbitration terms than
Second Life, Facebook can point to another potentially important
difference: the facts in Bragg are egregious in that the CEO of Second
57. Id.
58. Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 610.
59. Id. at 606-07.
60. Facebook, supra note 49.
61. Bragg, 487 F.Supp.2d. at 608-09.
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Life made important statements outside of the four comers of the
agreement that were in clear tension with terms in the agreement and
with Second Life's behavior in de-activating Bragg's account and
confiscating his property.62 By contrast, there is no evidence that
Facebook is making statements outside of the four comers of the
contract that contradict those in the contract.
This truth provides little salvation to Facebook, however, for two
reasons. First, while the court in Bragg appeared especially outraged
at Linden's misleading statements made in extra-contractual settings,
it appears that Second Life's statements within the four comers of the
contract were sufficiently misleading in this regard.63 The court's
unconscionability analysis regarding arbitration is confined almost
exclusively to the terms contained within the Terms of Use.64
Likewise, Facebook's statements made within the four comers of the
contract are sufficiently misleading in their own right. As will be
shown below, additional difficulties are created when these terms are
compared to those in Facebook's Privacy Policy. This point is off the
mark, however, as it goes to the purported misrepresentations of
Second Life regarding ownership of property. Facebook's terms with
regard to arbitration, however, are not likely to be deemed
unconscionable. Facebook's terms are better than other UGC mega-
sites besides Second Life, as some of these sites offer comparable or
even worse terms than those of Second Life.
65
This does not let Facebook off the hook, however. Facebook's
Terms of Use contain provisions that are fundamental
misrepresentations that include contradictions in terms, such that the
62. One of the factors the court in Bragg appeared to find significant was that Second
Life did not merely passively provide a term that allowed for ownership but it actively promoted
this feature. Id. at 595-96. ("Defendant Rosedale personally joined in efforts to publicize
Linden's recognition of rights in virtual property .... [and] continued to personally hype the
ownership of virtual property on Second Life"). While this is true, there is no indication that the
court found this oral representation dispositive or an essential element to the claim of
misrepresentation. Courts may follow Bragg in showing a willingness to look outside the four
comers of the contract in making a judgment regarding what constituted the agreement between
the parties. As a practical implication, this means that these sites must monitor what they say
about UGC in other contexts besides the Terms of Service. It also means that potential plaintiffs
will want to determine what the sites may have said about ownership in other contexts besides
the Terms of Service.
63. Id. at 611.
64. Id. at 605-11.
65. For example, the Terms of Use for YouTube state that "the YouTube Website shall
be deemed a passive website that does not give rise to personal jurisdiction over YouTube,
either specific or general, in jurisdictions other than California." YouTube, Terms of Use, 14,
www.youtube.com/t/terms (last visited Apr. 17, 2008) [hereinafter YouTube].
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key terms regarding copyright licenses pertaining to UGC must be
rendered a nullity. Recall that in Bragg, the substantive
misappropriation and fraud alleged by Bragg concerned Second Life's
statements concerning ownership of property.66 Other UGC sites also
contain terms pertaining to ownership of property by users. These
other sites do not tell users that they may come to own property.
Rather, these sites acknowledge that users already own property,
presumably by virtue of the fact that the users and creators of the
property and the works are not works-for-hire and hence ownership
would vest in the users although the Terms of Use and Terms of
Service of these sites merely acknowledge the fact of user
ownership. 67 The relevant terms do not pertain to how users may
come to own property but instead to how the sites may come to take
an interest in this UGC by means of terms in the Terms of Use.
Let us now consider the terms in Facebook's Terms of Use that
pertain to ownership of UGC. The Terms of Use prints out as eight
single-space pages. The first mention of "User Content" comes in
Paragraph 4, under the heading, "Property Rights in Site Content,
Limited License," where the text distinguishes "Site Content" in
which Facebook claims exclusive ownership from "User Content,"
with regard to which the Terms of Use note, "[e]xcept for your own
User Content, you may not upload or republish Site Content on any
Internet, Intranet or Extranet site or incorporate the information in any
other database or compilation, and any other use of the Site Content is
strictly prohibited., 68 In Paragraph 8, under the heading, "User
Content Posted on the Site," the Terms of Use notes:
Facebook does not assert any ownership over your User Content;
rather, as between us and you, subject to the rights granted to us in
these Terms, you retain full ownership of all of your User Content
and any intellectual property rights or other proprietary rights
associated with your User Content. 69
Subsequently, the Terms of Use states, "[w]hen you post User
Content to the Site, you authorize and direct us to make such copies
66. Bragg, 487 F.Supp.2d. at 595-96.
67. See, e.g., MySpace, Terms of Use,
www.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=misc.terms (last visited Apr. 17, 2008) [hereinafter
MySpace] ("After posting your Content to the MySpace Services, you continue to retain all
ownership in such Content...."); YouTube, supra note 65, 6C ("For clarity, you retain all of
your ownership rights in your User Submissions."); Revver, Member Agreement, 10b,
www.Revver.com/go/tou (last visited Apr. 17, 2008).
68. Facebook, supra note 49.
69. Id.
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thereof as we deem necessary in order to facilitate the posting and
storage of the User Content on the Site.",70 This fairly innocuous term
is followed in the same paragraph by an extraordinary grab for the
copyright interests of users.
By posting User Content to any part of the Site, you automatically
grant... to the Company an irrevocable, perpetual, non-exclusive,
transferable, fully paid, worldwide license (with the right to
sublicense) to use, copy, publicly perform, publicly display,
reformat, translate, excerpt (in whole or in part) and distribute such
User Content for any purpose, commercial, advertising, or
otherwise, on or in connection with the Site or the promotion
thereof, to prepare derivative works of, or incorporate into other
works, such User Content, and to grant and authorize sublicenses
of the foregoing.
71
To dispel what may appear to be an inconsistency, it is worth
first noting that a grant of a non-exclusive license would not create an
ownership interest, as the Copyright Act provides that whereas
exclusive licenses create an ownership interest, non-exclusive licenses
do not.72 Note the relationship between the two bits of text just
quoted. By general interpretive norms of paragraph construction, the
first section of the text should be the dominating term as it heads the
paragraph. Thus, on a natural reading of the paragraph, conventions
of draftsmanship would lead one to intuitively take the second bit of
text to be a further specification of the provision contained in the first,
which heads the paragraph. This would be a false impression,
however, as the legal logic of the two terms is the opposite. The
second quote is the more general and encompassing provision in
which Facebook claims a very broad, sweeping, albeit, non-exclusive
right to users' UGC, including the extraordinary claim to a right to
sublicense for "any purpose" including "commercial purposes" as
long as the activity is "in connection with Site or the promotion
thereof." Most striking is the capaciousness of the term, "in
connection with the Site." Unless one of Facebook's employees was
on a frolic and detour, by definition any activity that the site rationally
chose to pursue will be in connection to the site. Indeed, if and when
Facebook becomes a publicly-traded company, its corporate actors
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See 17 U.S.C. § 204 (2000).
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will have a fiduciary duty to only take actions that have some rational
"connection" to the site.73
Note for example that were Facebook to surreptitiously
sublicense user content to pomo.com for commercial purposes, this
would fall squarely within the license Facebook purports to be
granted by users. It is fair to say that the vast majority of Facebook
users would be extremely surprised to learn that the only thing
stopping Facebook from legally sublicensing their creative and
personal content to pomo.com or anyone else is the fact that the site
currently does not perceive such activity to be in its interest.74
Getting back to the relationship between this more capacious
second quote, and the one that heads the paragraph, the latter renders
the former a legal redundancy. Of course, if the site can do what it
pleases with user content, then it can "make such copies thereof as we
deem necessary in order to facilitate the posting and storage of User
Content., 75 Indeed, without a lawyer's training, one might be inclined
to think that because the lead sentence claimed authorization by users
to Facebook to make copies in order to facilitate posting and storage,
that the second block of text was merely an explication of this leading
idea. In other words, the structure of the paragraph itself is such as to
cause deliberate misunderstanding in the lay reader. Perhaps not
surprising, the misunderstanding tends to work to the user's
detriment. Thus, in the above discussion, we have seen that Facebook
artfully drafts the terms of the paragraph to create the impression that
they will use the user's content for purposes of the site's general
functioning, when in fact they purport to take a much broader and
thus more valuable license in users' content. This is a clear instance
of the deceptive and surprising terms that the Bragg court focused on
in finding unconscionability.7 6
As was seen in Part II, in the designation of contract of adhesion,
courts look at such things as whether the terms were conspicuous.
77
Facebook's claim to a license that would allow it to secretly
73. See 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1460 (2007).
74. In addition to their legitimate property claims, given the frequent incidence of data
theft, it is completely reasonable for users to prefer that extra copies of their personal profiles
not lie around in some company's archives. In Facebook's short existence, it has already made
significant missteps with regard to its respect for its users' personal data. See Robert Verkaik &
Jerome Taylor, Facebook Backlash Over Sale of Personal Data, INDEPENDENT Nov. 24, 2007,
http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/facebook-backlash-over-sale-of-
personal-data-760221 .html.
75. See Facebook, supra note 49 and accompanying text.
76. Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 605-11 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
77. Id.
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sublicense user content to porno.com is the opposite of conspicuous;
it is artfully hidden, both by its location within the paragraph, and
more artfully, by the implicit interpretive canons of paragraph
construction.
Unconscionability analysis looks to the overall character of the
bargaining situation.78 The following examples are even more
damaging for Facebook. As we saw in Bragg, Second Life ostensibly
promised users that they could own their content but, in the fine print
of the contract, qualified this term to such a degree as to render it
substantially false.79 We saw earlier that the term purportedly
allowing Second Life to cancel Bragg's account, at its discretion, with
the mandatory expensive arbitration terms, combined to leave Bragg
without an effective remedy. 80 There is a parallel situation in the
context of Facebook, although one not involving virtual real estate but
instead UGC.
In paragraph 9, just discussed, the Terms of Use state that "[y]ou
may remove your User Content from the Site at any time. If you
choose to remove your User Content, the license granted above will
automatically expire, however you acknowledge that the Company
may retain archived copies of your User Content." 81 First off, I must
note that this text supports the above interpretative analysis in which I
claim that the second portion of text legally encompasses the first.
Moreover, Facebook implicitly agrees, for the above quote notes that
if the user wants to remove her content, the license granted to
Facebook will expire. This expiration of the non-exclusive license
nullifies the second bit of text in Paragraph 8, in which the user is
purported to grant a non-exclusive license. No mention is made in the
text with regard to the first bit of text in which the Site purports to
receive authorization to make copies, "in order to facilitate the
posting and storage of the User Content on the Site. 82 No parallel
new term is proffered that will nullify the authorization granted in this
first term. Thus, Facebook is caught on the horns of a dilemma. Either
this first term is encompassed in the second more capacious term, as I
argued above, and thus does not require independent nullification, as
it is nullified when the second encompassing term is nullified by the
text stating that the non-exclusive license will automatically expire
78. See Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 605.
79. Id. at 595-97.
80. Id. at 595-97, 605-611.
81. Facebook, supra note 49.
82. Id.
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when the users removes her content thus supporting my interpretation
above. Alternatively, the first term is not encompassed in the second
term, in which case it would need to be independently nullified. Since
it is not independently nullified, then it is still be operative even after
the user has removed her content. But if this latter interpretation is the
better one concerning the relationship between the first and second
bits of text in Paragraph 8, then another problem is created for
Facebook that again offers witness to an unconscionability of terms.
On either interpretation then, Facebook's terms in this paragraph are
unconscionably vague.
Continuing with further examination of the text from Paragraph
8, additional vagueness issues are seen. The specific portions that are
so vague as to be seriously misleading are the pair of claims stating 1)
that when the user takes her content off the site, the non-exclusive
license held by Facebook is revoked, but 2) also say that Facebook
retains the right to keep the archived copy.83 What is the legal status
of this so-called archived copy? The notion of an archived copy has
no established meaning in copyright law. It is not defined in the
Copyright Act's definitional section 101.84 Section 117 of the
Copyright Act uses the concept of an "archival copy" in the context of
computer software, in creating an exception to general copyright rules
such that in certain conditions a software purchaser can make an
archival copy in case the first copy is damaged or rendered
unusable.85 Is an archived copy like a physical copy in the sense that
one may own a copy of a book but not retain any copyrights with
respect to the book? If this is correct, then it might be consistent to
say that an ownership interest is retained under the First Sale
Doctrine.86 If an archived copy is indeed comparable to a copy as per
83. Id.
84. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). With regard to this term, Facebook is outdone by YouTube,
which retains the right to keep a "server copy." YouTube, supra note 65, 6C. Given that the
context is digital, any copy will be a server copy and the adjective is completely vacuous. In
other words, YouTube retains a right to keep a copy and says nothing further about how they
may use such copy. Without any qualification as to use, they thus retain the right to ise server
copies that have been removed or deleted in whatever manner is legal.
85. 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(2) (2000) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is
not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the
making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided ... such new copy or
adaptation is for archival purposes."). Note, however, that this provision further provides, "that
all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the computer program
should cease to be rightful." Id.
86. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the
owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person
2008] AGREEMENTS BETWEEN USERS AND MEGA-SITES 851
the First Sale Doctrine, then indeed it would be true that Facebook
retained no copyright interest, or at least not one that was not an
exception under the Copyright Act, as the First Sale Doctrine is an
exception to the copyright owner's right of distribution. Perhaps this
is what Facebook has in mind when it refers to an archived copy.
Three points are pertinent on this construction of an archived
copy. First, this would entail that Facebook would have no right to
make copies of the archival copy. This would mean that Facebook
would not be permitted to make copies even if only to do searches of
the text if doing so entailed even making RAM copies.87 Facebook
would, however, have the right to distribute this copy in the sense that
under the First Sale Doctrine an owner of a copy of a book may not
copy it but she can distribute it. For example, selling the book to a
used bookstore or giving the book to a friend would count as a
distribution. Thus, if the archived copy is best understood in terms of
the First Sale Doctrine, then Facebook could not copy its copy but it
could still sell it to pomo.com.
Most important, however, even if indeed this is really what
Facebook intends, this would still be in contradiction to the Terms of
Use. For as previously indicated, Facebook goes further than
promising to give the intellectual property rights back, it says the user
retains all "proprietary rights."88 The notion of a proprietary right
does not have a precise definition but in the manner in which it is
used, it would be reasonable for adult users to understand this as
meaning all other possible property and property-like interests, that is,
anything of value, pertaining to the user's creative content. Such an
archived copy would presumably have commercial value-otherwise
Facebook would not spend money to maintain these copies. But if it
has commercial value, then Facebook cannot be said to have returned
to the user all that is of proprietary interest. Thus, this combination of
contractual terms is worse than ambiguous, worse than surprising and
intentionally vague. These terms are a downright contradiction when
juxtaposed to one another. The user is told both that she retains all
intellectual property and other proprietary interests in her content and
is also told that she grants a perpetual right to Facebook to retain an
archived copy-but since an archived copy can only be understood as
authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or
otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.").
87. See MAI Sys. Corp. v.Peak Computer, Inc. 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding a
RAM copy sufficiently permanent for purposes of satisfying test for fixation).
88. Facebook, supra note 49.
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a proprietary interest, the user is promised both x and not-x, which is
a contradiction. As one learns in any introductory logic class, if a
contradiction is true, all other propositions can be proven. Thus, we
can only conclude that the Terms of Use regarding users' ownership
of their intellectual property and other proprietary interests are non-
propositional nonsense. This is an extremely strong factor in drawing
the conclusion that to apply such terms to the disadvantage of a user
would be unconscionable. If the site were actually interested in full
and complete disclosure, it would explain what an archival copy is,
how such copies are currently being used, and how they might be
used.8 9
Consider next a second contradiction contained within the Terms
of Use. The Terms provide that, "[t]hese Terms of Use constitute the
entire agreement between you and Company regarding the use of the
Site and/or the Service, superseding any prior agreements between
you and Company relating to your use of the Site or the Service." 90
The Terms of Use note, as well, that "[w]ithout limiting any of the
foregoing, you also agree to abide by our Facebook Code of Conduct
that provides further information regarding the authorized conduct of
users of Facebook." 91 The text for "Code of Conduct" provides a link
to this Code. Later, the Terms of Use states, "In addition to these
Terms of Use, Facebook Pages are subject to and governed by certain
Additional Terms Applicable to Facebook Pages. The Additional
Terms Applicable to Facebook Pages control in the event of any
conflict between them and the Terms of Use."92 In other words, any
terms in the Terms of Use are purportedly rendered meaningless by a
contrary term in the Additional Applicable Terms. Whereas the
language introducing the Code of Conduct states that "you agree to
abide by our Facebook Code of Conduct," no such terms connoting
exchange are provided with regard to the Additional Applicable
Terms. That is, the user is not told that by using the service she agrees
to be bound by the Applicable Terms. Given that the user is told that
she must agree to abide by the Code of Conduct but is not told this
with regard to the Applicable Additional Terms, she is reasonable in
concluding that she has therefore not agreed to the Additional
Applicable Terms. Facebook's reply will be obvious; given that the
89. One site does make an effort to explain legal jargon in plain English, which
demonstrates at the least that it is possible to make such an effort. See MySpace, supra note 67,
6.1.
90. Facebook, supra note 49.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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Terms of Use state that the Additional Applicable Terms trump, and
given that the user accepts the terms in the Terms of Use as a
condition of use, then by implication the user assents to the term
stating that the Additional Applicable Terms trump. The user has a
winning reply to this, however, which is that she assented to the
Terms of Use and the Terms of Use contains a term stating that these
terms she is agreeing to are trumped, but she has not thereby agreed to
be bound by these additional terms. The statement in the Terms of
Use, without an agreement between the parties, is merely a statement
of fact. The site might as well have said that there will be a harvest
moon next month.
Whether this is true and whether the Additional Applicable
Terms trump The Terms of Use are both statements of fact that are
either true or not, regardless of what the user thinks or does. Telling
the user that the Additional Applicable Terms trump and
propositioning a user to accept these terms for valuable consideration
are two different things. It would be reasonable for a user to contend
that if the site wanted the user to assent to these additional terms, the
site would have contained language of exchange in the manner that it
did with regard to the Code of Conduct. At the very least, given that
there was an explicit deal offered in the Code of Conduct, a
reasonable user is justified in finding the terms vague and confusing.
This is precisely what the doctrine of unconscionability in the context
of form contracts is meant to address and discourage. Accordingly,
this sort of ambiguity would fall into the category of procedural
unconscionability under the schema set out by California courts as
discussed in Bragg.
More confusion yet is created by Facebook's Privacy Policy and
its relation to the Terms of Use. In the Terms of Use, the only text
under the bolded heading "Privacy," reads as follows: "We care about
the privacy of our users. Click here to view the Facebook's [sic]
Privacy Policy. By using the Site or the Service, you are consenting to
have your personal data transferred to and processed in the United
States. 93 We see here terms of exchange similar to the language of
agreement regarding the user's agreement to abide by the Code of
Conduct (and thus dissimilar to the Additional Applicable Terms).
There is a problem, however, because the Privacy Policy
contains terms that are outside the scope of what may legitimately be
construed as one's "personal data." Personal data is information about
particular users. This sort of information is collected by numerous
93. Facebook, supra note 49.
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websites.94 Perhaps the central reason to collect personal data is that
websites can use it to more effectively market to users. Facebook's
privacy policy has a provision, however, that concerns not personal
data but instead a user's copyrightable content, namely, her written
communications with other users. The Privacy Policy states, "[w]hen
you make use of the communication features of the service to share
information with other individuals on Facebook, however, (e.g.,
sending a personal message to another Facebook user) you generally
cannot remove such communications. 95 Note that such content is not
personal data, but rather UGC.
The obvious question is what this term is doing in the Privacy
Policy when it concerns copyrightable content. This type of UGC is
not discussed where it should be discussed, which of course is in the
Terms of Use. Indeed, the one paragraph in the Terms of Use that
discusses UGC does not explicitly mention these communications.
Or, to be precise, those communications that display more than de
minimis originality, are copyright protected UGC.9 6 As such, they
logically fall under the broader topic, "User Content," as used by the
Terms of Use. And as such, these communications are promised to be
given back to the user when she leaves the Site, for as discussed
above, users are told they can take all their "User Consent" with them
except for an archived copy of this content. Thus, once again, the
Terms of Use, when combined with other Facebook documents,
contain a contradiction in terms. The user is both told that she can
take back all her user content, except for the archived copy, and also
told the opposite, namely that she cannot take all her content besides
94. The key fact about information for present purposes is that it is factual in nature and
thus not creative. A fundamental requirement of copyrightable content is that it originate with
the creator. By contrast, information is propositional in nature-a purported piece of
information is either true or false-an original creative work fixed in a tangible medium of
expression is not propositional. For example, the painting Mona Lisa is neither true nor false,
although purported personal information about her such as that she wears a mustache in her
Duchamp portrait is falsifiable or verifiable.
95. Facebook, Privacy Policy, www.facebook.com/policy.php (last visited Mar. 24,
2008).
96. User's conversations, or at least those that exhibit a minimal spark of creativity, will
be copyrightable, because unlike typical spoken conversations in an offline context, these
conversations are fixed in a tangible medium, namely, residing on Facebook servers as stored
digital content, and thus satisfy the two elements necessary for copyrightability-original
expression of a more than de minimis amount and fixation. Perhaps some bits of conversation
would be too brief or lacking in originality-such as if a user merely types in the word, "yes."
Other chunks of conversation are undeniably highly creative and hence clearly copyrightable,
particularly given the low threshold for copyrightability established under Feist. See Feist
Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. 499 U.S. 340, 345-47 (1991).
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the archived copy because, in addition to not getting back the
archived copy, she is also not getting back the conversations referred
to in the Privacy Policy. Once again, then, Facebook is guilty of
making false and misleading representations in its Terms of Use.
Given the above discussed contradictions and misrepresentations
regarding core aspects of the so-called agreement between users and
Facebook, one can only conclude that the Terms of Use are a nullity
with regard to the key terms that concern transfer of copyright
interests. What is the implication of this? If there is no written
agreement, then by application of section 204 of the Copyright Act,
there is no valid transfer of copyright interests since such transfers
must be in writing.97 The implication of this is that all copying of
users' UGC is done without authority, which in turn leads to the
conclusion that Facebook is a massive infringer of UGC. This sort of
massive infringement is on a scale the likes of which we have only
seen before in cases such as Napster98 and Grokster.99 In each of those
cases, the infringement was so massive, and the potential liability so
devastating, that each of these companies folded. In Part IV below, I
will argue that, contrary to what made sense for Napster or Grokster,
the best public policy solution would not involve driving Facebook
and its peers out of business due to their current status as massive
infringers. First, however, I will delve further into Facebook's
unconscionable contract with the goal of driving a stake through the
heart of Facebook's pernicious Terms of Use.
B. Unconscionability of Facebook's Agreements with Minors
This section examines the agreement between Facebook and its
users who happen to be minors. The fact that a significant number of
Facebook users are between the ages of thirteen and eighteen 00 raises
the question under what conditions, if any, can minors sell, license,
give away, or in other ways dispose of their intellectual property.' 0'
The Copyright Act does not address the topic of alienation of
works by minors. Nevertheless, a core provision in the Act dealing
with exchange of intellectual property interests is relevant. The Act
97. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2000).
98. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002).
99. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
100. See Anne Barnard, After Inquiry, Facebook Agrees to Tougher Safeguards, NY.
TIMES, Oct. 17, 2007, at B5.
101. Facebook, supra note 49 ("By using the Service or the Site, you represent and warrant
that you are 13 or older and in high school or college, or else that you are 18 or older, and that
you agree to and to abide by all of the terms and conditions of this Agreement.").
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states, "[a] transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of
law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or
memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of
the rights conveyed or such owner's duly authorized agent."'1 2 The
Act does not comment one way or another as to whether this owner or
her duly authorized agent must be of legal age.
The above provision from the Copyright Act establishes that
there must be a writing. As courts have noted, this is in effect a statute
of frauds provision. 10 3 Such provisions are meant to protect the
bargaining parties in transactions of material significance.
Consequently, statutes of frauds typically have a lower dollar limit.
For example, transactions valued below $500 often do not require a
writing. 104 Given this background, it is notable that the statute of
frauds provision in the Copyright Act does not have a lower dollar
limit. This might be read as an implicit statement by Congress that
there are no transfers of copyright interests that are too insignificant
to be worthy of being reduced to writing.
Another explanation, however, may be more in keeping with
other parts of copyright law. A venerable principle of copyright is that
it is intrinsically difficult to place a value of a work prior to its release
for commercial exploitation.'0 5 In recognition of this fact, Congress
for example created a renewal term so that authors who may have
sold or licensed their works for too little can reclaim them later, once
the work's commercial value has become established. 10 6 Similarly,
after thirty-five years, authors can terminate licenses. 0 7 Both of these
provisions are justified in part due to the inherent difficulty of
accurately valuing creative works. 08 Thus, a function of requiring a
writing for all transactions can be seen as an implicit recognition that
prior to commercial exploitation, it may be very difficult to say which
works are worth more than $500 and which are not, because when it
comes to valuing creative works, the future tells the past. Indeed,
creative works present the interesting situation in which it may not be
102. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a).
103. See 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statute of Frauds § 428 (2007).
104. Id.
105. See generally 18 AM. JUR. 2D Copyrights § 2 (2007).
106. See 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2000).
107. See 17 U.S.C. 203(a)(3).
108. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5740
("A provision of this sort [203] is needed because of the unequal bargaining position of authors,
resulting in part from the impossibility of determining a work's value until it has been
exploited").
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knowable which particular works will be commercially successful and
yet know that in aggregate some will be very valuable.
This is likely true of the UGC posted on sites such as Facebook
considered in toto. Given the millions of minors posting content, it is
inevitable that a significant portion of the next generation of famous
poets, fiction writers, songwriters, visual artists, filmmakers, et
cetera, will have posted their early works on Facebook. 09 Given the
tremendous value of early works by artists of past generations such as
Picasso and Dali, there is every reason to believe that some of the
creative content that ends up in Facebook's archives will come to be
of tremendous value. If we take the step, a la Justice Breyer in the
Eldred dissent, we would seek to formulate the net present value of
such works.1 l l Those works that will be very valuable in the future
will accordingly have a greater discounted net present value. While
we may not know which particular works have this higher value,
given the many millions of such works archived by Facebook, we can
nevertheless know that these works, taken in aggregate, have a
significant net present value. Thus, given that some works will be of
tremendous value and many others of moderate value along with the
difficulty in determining up front which is which, it makes sense to
require that all authors be protected by the requirement of a writing.
In the end, this may be the only means to guarantee that all creators of
works that end up being valuable receive the benefit provided by the
statute of frauds.
This discussion provides an answer to one initial objection that
may be made to the notion that the creative content of Facebook's
users is worth worrying about. Facebook might seek to maintain that
concerns regarding the purported unconscionability of its Terms of
Use are a tempest in a teapot, as the creative content posted by users
is of de minimis value and hence the conditions under which
proprietary rights in it are purportedly transferred are not worth
worrying about. After all, the law lets minors buy candy bars or toy
cars because the price is de minimis. The response is that by having
what is in effect a statute of frauds provision, the Copyright Act
clearly indicated that all such exchanges are judged by Congress to be
worthy of contemplation based on the rationale just considered.
109. Statistically, it will be the case that most content is not separately commercially
valuable. Nevertheless, if one considers the fact that say 75% of eligible minors between 13-18
are on Facebook, then there is a good chance that every future Dylan, Springsteen, Cobain, etc.,
will have signed over a permanent copy of their youthful creative expression to be used as an
archival copy.
110. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 242-67 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Accordingly, if minors can transfer their copyright interests, they
can only do so by means of a writing. Thus, we are led to the
question; what instrument was signed by the minor or her duly
authorized agent? The answer is of course being that minors, like
other users who wish to remain on the site, click a button to signify
acceptance of the Terms of Use. Given the nature of this procedure,
the question naturally arises as to whether the Terms of Service
constitute a contract of adhesion, and if so, an unconscionable one.
This question, was considered in the previous Section for a. non-
specified Facebook user with the implicit assumption that such a
person was in a position to bargain with Facebook. We see now that
when it comes to minors, even this assumption must be questioned.
Therefore, the question of unconscionability must also be raised again
in the context of minors. For those acts that are unconscionable when
done to adults, it will be hard to resist the inference that they are even
more unconscionable when done to minors. Thus, it is highly
significant to the issue of whether Facebook treats minors
unconscionably, that Facebook was seen in the last Section to treat
adults unconscionably.
Given that the Terms of Use, Additional Applicable Terms,
Privacy Policy and Code of Conduct are the same for adults and
minors, a close examination of these documents leads to the
conclusion that because the Terms of Use are unconscionable with
regard to certain key terms with regard to adults, they are more so
unconscionable for minors. As a general rule, minors are not allowed
to sign contracts, for the obvious reason that because they are minors,
they have not yet reached the age of reason so as to be able to
rationally enter into business transactions."' If we don't let children
sign away their inheritance or buy and sell items such as autos and
houses, why is it they should be able to transact away what may be
very valuable intellectual property rights? In general, the law requires
a parent or guardian to oversee decisions of financial significance to
minors. 112 Without such laws, the world being what it is, it is
predictable that some adults, or even other minors, would prey on
minors.11 3 Indeed, I will contend that precisely this sort of exploitation
111. Seel 7A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 28 (2007).
112. See Id. (as applied to financial contracts).
113. One can draw a parallel with the manner in which musicians were allegedly
mistreated by their record labels in the past. From a laissez faire point of view, it is indeed true
that the artists signed agreements and received consideration and yet the substantive unfairness
of these agreements is legendary. See Edna Gundersen, Rights Issues Rock the Music World,
USA TODAY Sept. 16, 2002, at ID, http://www.usatoday.com/life/music/news/2002-09-15-
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is taking place between Facebook and its under-age and vulnerable
users.
Thus, there is an independent reason for claiming that the terms
should be a nullity when it comes to minors, namely, that as a matter
of policy, we should not allow minors to contract away what might be
valuable property. The difference between legal adults and minors is
very important in contract law. While it may be a legal fiction to do
so, we hold adults to the terms of contracts, even when they are very
complex contracts full of legal jargon that realistically we could not
expect non-lawyers to comprehend.' 14 We hold adults to the terms of
these contracts nevertheless because adults who cannot understand a
contract are expected to appreciate this fact and so, if it matters
enough to them, they can hire an attorney. But, as a general rule,
courts are much more protective of minors; we think that minors are
not fully rational when it comes to judging the meaning of a complex
legal document like the Terms of Service, or being able to judge that
their understanding is inadequate and hence that they need to consult
a lawyer.'15 Suppose a fourteen-year old somehow accessed one-
hundred thousand dollars that had been given to her and bought an
expensive car on EBay. No judge would uphold this contract if
challenged in court. Thus, it is worth asking whether contracting away
one's UGC is more like buying a candy bar, or whether it is like a
more significant transaction, such as buying an expensive car.
IV. A PROPOSED NORMATIVE SOLUTION THROUGH
IMPLIED LICENSES
As the above discussion has demonstrated, Facebook is indeed a
bad corporate actor in that it proffered an unconscionable contract
upon millions of users including millions of minors. This of course
raises the question as to what is to be done since this situation cannot
rightfully continue. Comparing the present situation with that of
Napster and Grokster, the important difference is that these earlier
sites had business models that were inherently contradictory to a
regulatory regime that protected copyrights in songs, movies, and
other content. It is simply impossible to have peer-to-peer file sharing
available to users for free while also protecting the copyrights of
artists-rights x.htm. Here too, there is a situation in which the creative content is provided by a
legion of outsiders, while the distribution and aggregation comes from a small number of
companies. At least in the case of the musicians, it can be said that they were adults.
114. See generally 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 28 (2007).
115. See Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12 (1981).
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owners of the shared works against piracy. Thus, one must go. Either
we dramatically reshape copyright law such that making literally
billions of unauthorized copies of commercially viable creative works
available to be freely copied is allowed, or we shut down the business
built on providing this service. By contrast, Facebook does not
present an inherent tension with established rights of copyright law.
Facebook may well think that it deserves to have an interest in
the UGC since Facebook gives much of this content much of its
value. The value of an individual's content will often depend in large
part on being found in the same place as the content from all the other
people on the site. Thus, the site might well argue on fairness grounds
that it is the one that is in the stronger position to claim ownership,
given that users are allowed to use the site for free and receive what
are clearly tremendous benefits from participation in the site, at least
by their demonstrated preferences-nothing else besides the
perception of receipt of tremendous value could explain the
amazingly rapid growth in users.
There is a telling response to this claim, however, which is that
while this view may have some merit as a normative, fairness-based
argument, it does not have a legal basis. The position of Facebook
amounts to a version of a sweat of the brow doctrine, which is
rejected in modem copyright law. 116 Even if the site has some raw,
normative claim, nevertheless, copyright law rewards the creators of
original content, not those who provide the creators a venue to create
or the tools to facilitate such creation. The creators are the owners.
Thus, the sites must bargain to get ownership. In other words, the
users are the owners of the content because it vests with them due to
their role as creators. This raises the question as to why Facebook
does not simply put in the Terms of Service the term that in exchange
for access to the site, the user relinquishes its rights in its creative
product. This seems like a realistic option, as generally speaking,
users likely do not read these Terms of Service. And even if they did,
it is surely the case that most would not understand very well what
they were agreeing to. For the small number of people who both read
the terms and understand them, some might think that access to the
site was worth the exchange of their content. Others might not want to
use the site under these conditions, but as long as the number of these
people was not large, the site could likely tolerate the loss.117
116. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
117. For there to be ownership, the site would have to include language claiming an
exclusive license. It might be enough for the site's intended purposes to claim a non-exclusive
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This raises the question as to why the site does not seek such
licenses. One possible answer is that the site is like Second Life in
that it seeks to offer more to the user in order to compete with other
sites by offering more favorable terms.' 18 This explanation is belied,
however, by the fact that Facebook does not promote its competitive
advantage in the manner that Second Life does. Recall that the CEO
of Second Life appeared in a town forum to promote the prospect of
ownership in Second Life. 119 In the case of Facebook, if it really
sought to promote a competitive advantage by providing favorable
ownership provisions, it would have been obvious to Facebook why
merely providing the relevant terms in the Terms of Use would not
work to promote these terms to users-because the terms are in
legalize that the average user would not understand even if she read
the long complex Terms of Use. This is clearly why Second Life took
steps to promote its competitive advantage above and beyond merely
including the relevant terms in the Terms of Service. Namely, it knew
that if it merely put the statement that users could own and buy and
sell their property in Second Life in the Terms of Service, no one
would come to know this fact as people do not generally read these
terms.
There is an option we have not considered, however. Perhaps the
UGC mega-sites do not want to have ownership of the UGC.
Furthermore, they might argue that the very fact that they do not
desire to own the work is evidence that they would not make
misrepresentative statements to users in order to get it. The obvious
question is why would the sites have such a preference? The content
obviously has value as indicated by the fact that advertising driven
business models are being built around this content and sites such as
MySpace and YouTube have been sold for large sums of money. 2°
perpetual license to use the work. A non-exclusive license is not property. See Peter S. Menell,
Bankruptcy Treament of Intellectual Property Assets: An Economic Analysis, 22 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 733, 786 (2007) ("Nonexclusive licenses are viewed as conferring personal, as
opposed to property, rights.").
118. The idea is that ownership will allow an economy to burgeon as users develop
products and bring them to market. In the short existence of Second Life, such an economy is in
the process of developing.
119. See Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F.Supp.2d 593, 596 (E.D. Pa. 2007). See
also Posting of Nobody Fugazi (pseudonom) to Your2ndPlace, Petition to Linden Lab
Regarding Losses Incurred Related to Landbots, http://your2ndplace.com/node/615, (Sept. 26,
2007, 15:39).
120. See Bambi Francisco, Buying MySpace as the Centerpiece, MARKET WATCH, July
18, 2005 (MySpace sold for $580 million); Michael Arrington, Google Has Acquired YouTube,
TECHCRUNCH, Oct. 9, 2006, http://www.techcrunch.com/2006/10/09/google-has-acquired-
youtube/ (YouTube sold for $1.65 billion).
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There is indeed an important reason why the sites might not want
to claim ownership. Such ownership might compromise the position
of the sites when it comes to seeking safe harbor from infringement
liability as a compliant ISP under section 512 of the Copyright Act, or
for defeating defamation claims as a distributor rather than a publisher
under section 230.121 Thus, when Facebook and YouTube provide
terms in the Terms .of Service that state "you own the content," they
are not being magnanimous but instead laying the groundwork for
their legal defense should they be sued for infringement or
defamation. Indeed, YouTube is currently being sued by Viacom in a
massive infringement lawsuit. 22 Predictably, YouTube is seeking to
come within the section 512 safe harbor. On the facts, it seems like an
open question at this point whether YouTube will be able to
successfully mount a section 512 defense. Clearly the plaintiffs do not
think so. Viacom, et al., allege both indirect and direct
infringement. 123 The closer YouTube is to the content, in terms of
ownership, the harder it would be to distance itself when it comes to
invoking the section 512 safe harbors. Thus, we see that Second Life
may be in a significantly different position than other mega-sites in
affirmatively wanting its users to be aware of the fact that they may
be owners. Second Life has reason to trumpet this fact as a
competitive advantage. By contrast, sites such as Facebook want to
have these terms in the Terms of Service in order to put themselves in
the best position to offer a section 512 safe harbor defense. But the
goal may be served without users' awareness. This also helps to
explain why Facebook would have reason to make
misrepresentations. It wants to have its cake and eat it too; for users to
be owners for purposes of section 512 of the Digital Millenium
Copyright Act but for Facebook to have use of the UGC nevertheless.
While it is understandable that Facebook would want both,
nevertheless, it can do with less. The reason is that Facebook's basic
service is not in tension with the copyright status quo. After all, users
create their own content and benefit from allowing Facebook to copy
the content to the extent that such copying is necessary to provide the
sorts of functionality that users desire from their participation in the
site. The question then is whether Facebook can maintain a scope of
use for their users' creative content that is both acceptable from a
121. 17 U.S.C. §§ 512 (2000); 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000).
122. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages, Viacom Int'l Inc.
v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07cv2103 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
123. Id.
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public policy perspective and also will be enough for Facebook to
retain its present status as a viable, and indeed thriving, business
model.
Facebook would appear to have two basic choices. First, it can
come clear and openly disclose to its users the full scope of rights and
interests it is now attempting to deceptively pilfer away from them. In
particular, Facebook could disclose that despite whatever sterling
intentions it might possess, in claiming the non-exclusive right to sub-
license users' content for any commercial purpose, if the site were to
be sold or taken public, the new owners would have an intolerably
wide scope of options regarding what they could do with the users'
content. In other words, it should be disclosed that certain plausible
scenarios for sublicensing content could be extremely deleterious to
the interests of a vast number of users. The site should also disclose
that all the "archived" copies that it retains, as well as the user
conversations it retains, are potentially commercially valuable
proprietary interests in the former case, and potentially commercially
valuable copyright protected UGC in the latter case. This would mean
that Facebook would have to remove the terms in its Terms of Service
that falsely state that it returns all intellectual property and proprietary
rights to users who choose to leave the site.'
24
Indeed, Facebook might intentionally make the decision that
disclosure is the preferable course of action. After all, people in large
part do not read the Terms of Use and so they might be none the wiser
were Facebook to openly disclose its now camouflaged behavior. But
such a strategy has its risks. While Facebook can pretty much count
on the fact that the overwhelming majority of users will not change
their behavior because of reading the Terms of Use, Privacy Policy,
Code of Conduct, et cetera, nevertheless, an awareness of the nature
of Facebook's practices may be brought to the attention of its users
through other means. For example, Facebook's competitors or
potential competitors might advertise Facebook's practices to
consumers in an effort to convince these consumers that their own
practices are more in line with users' expectations and desires.125
After all, this is what Second Life intended in trumpeting to the world
the claim, however exaggerated and misleading, that in contrast to
124. In addition, of course, Facebook would need to follow through on this promise,
contrary to its behavior up to this point. See Maria Aspan, How Sticky is Membership on
Facebook? Just Try Breaking Free, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2008, at Al,
http://www.nytimes.con/2008/02/l 1/technology/I I facebook.html.
125. See Facebook, supra note 49.
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other persistent virtual world sites, it allowed users to own property.
Second, the savvy minority of users or non-user consumer advocates
might take up the cause of making consumers aware of the true nature
of Facebook's claims. Given these risks of exposure, Facebook might
well choose a different course of action. It might decide that the
additional benefit it receives from retaining the archival copy and the
user conversations is not worth the potential bad publicity. After all,
its basic business model does not depend on either of these activities.
It should also be noted that while the terms left Facebook in a
position to surreptitiously "sublicense" user creative content for
"commercial purposes" to entities the likes of porno.com without
notifying the user, there is, nevertheless, no evidence that Facebook
has to date engaged in such abuses. True, Facebook presumably has
amassed archived copies of the creative content of former users as
well as the conversations of these users. 126 This database could be
destroyed, however. This would not of course erase the wrongs that
have already been committed. Given that the copies were made
pursuant to unconscionable terms that consequently should be voided,
the implication is that those copies of copyright protected content
were made without authorization, and are infringements. Thus, the
creators of this UGC would have infringement actions against
Facebook. While these wrongs should not be minimized,
nevertheless, from a conventional policy perspective, this is water
under the bridge. In terms of promoting copyright's welfarist
desiderata, what matters is whether on a going-forward basis, it makes
sense for Facebook and the Facebooks of the world to exist. Users
vote with their feet; Facebook is among the fastest growing websites
of all time. 127 On a going-forward basis, the unconscionable Terms of
Use can be amended in the manner described above.
Note, however, that while this solves the illegitimacy problem
vis-a-vis adults, it would not change the situation vis-i-vis minors. It
is impermissible to contract with minors for valuable consideration
even when all terms are openly and adequately disclosed. One
solution would require all minors to get actual verifiable consent of a
parent or legal guardian before being allowed to alienate their
126. It is not clear that there are many former users. The fact that Facebook has made it
difficult for former users to remove content is yet another sign of its bad faith in dealing with its
users vis-t-vis the provisions contained in the Terms of Use. See Aspan, supra note 124.
127. See Erik Schonfeld, Social Site Rankings (September 2007),
http://www.techcrunch.com/2007/l0/24/social-site-rankings-september-2007/ (last visited Apr.
21, 2008).
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property to Facebook via the click through agreement.128 This solution
sounds right in principle as it comports with how we treat children in
other contexts; that is, they are treated as too young to make
important decisions and thus those decisions can only come through
the consent of an adult. For example, this is the tack that the Federal
Trade Commission has taken with the collection of online personal
data from children under the age of thirteen, requiring that such
information can only be collected from them with explicit parental
consent.129 Perhaps this approach could be adapted for the transfer of
UGC from minors from the ages of thirteen to eighteen on Facebook.
This possible solution has one huge problem as a practical
matter, however. No matter how desirable it might be in principle for
minors to have their decisions regarding the transfer of rights to
potentially valuable property subject to adult supervision, in practice
the transactions costs would likely be extremely high, such that
Facebook would have a much more difficult time developing its large
user base. Experience with the Children's Online Privacy Protection
Act has shown this to be the case. The transactions costs of getting
explicit parental consent has significantly limited the number of such
sites and significantly raised the cost of business for those sites that
do exist.' 30 Sites such as Facebook plausibly have a more consumer
friendly mix of costs and benefits than do sites that rely heavily on
collecting personal data from young children, such that they should
not be heavily discouraged in the same manner as the young
children's sites.
Yet the model whereby minors between thirteen and eighteen
years of age are understood to form contracts with the sites by which
they may potentially alienate very valuable rights by means of a click
is deeply problematic. What is needed is a compromise solution under
which participation by minors in Facebook may be continued but
under greater supervision. This would be in contrast to the
interpretive norm in contract law whereby courts are loath to question
consideration. If minors are to be allowed to contract without explicit
128. See Mike Snider, Safe Cyber-playrooms, USA TODAY, Feb. 26, 2007,
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2007-02-26-nickelodeon-disney-social-sites-x.htm.
129. Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 13247 (March 15, 2006)
(codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 312).
130. Or at least to minors who admit to being under thirteen. A child under thirteen can
generally enter a site for those above thirteen simply by stating that his or her age is thirteen or
above. Julia Angwin, E-Business: New Children's Privacy Rules Pose Obstacles for Some Sites,
WALL ST. J., April 24, 2000, at B8 (noting the potential transaction costs for complying with
COPPA).
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adult supervision, then courts should play a background supervisory
role. This need not come through courts playing any sort of day to day
supervisory role. Instead, courts can most effectively supervise by
demonstrating a willingness to find implied contracts. Judges could
apply tests to these agreements that go beyond the minimal
requirement that there be consideration. The best outcome would be
for courts, when called upon to do so, to find an implied non-
exclusive license to use the uploaded content created by minor users
while on the site for those purposes that are transparent to users of the
site. 13 1 This would allow for the sorts of copying necessary to provide
the set of services for which users seek out and willingly participate in
the site.'32
There is one obvious objection to this approach. How can it
make sense to find an implied license between under-age users and
Facebook when I am claiming that minors should not be allowed to
form explicit licenses? Why is an implicit license any better than an
explicit license? My suggestion, however, is that the implied license
should be understood to run between Facebook and the parents or
guardians of the minors whose UGC is sought. An important
advantage of this more minimal interpretive principle is that it would
presumably disallow Facebook or its successors in interest from
claiming permanent UGC interests at some later time, on the basis of
capacious, largely incomprehensible lawyerly jargon, located in a
form contract the person clicked through years earlier when a minor.
For example, by application of the interpretive principle, the claim to
ownership of an archival copy would seem completely unjustified,
since it is in no way implied by the scope of copying necessitated by
the use of the site.
V. CONCLUSION
This article began as an examination of the contractual
relationships that exist between the creators of user-generated content
and the UGC mega-sites that host this content. We examined this
issue through the prism of the few cases that have emerged thus far
that deal with this relationship. The three cases surveyed above allow
131. See Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding an implied
license); 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §10.03[A][7]
(2007) ("[N]onexclusive licenses may . . . be granted orally, or may even be implied from
conduct.").
132. It is no surprise that this is the scope of use that Facebook misleadingly represents
itself as utilizing. Facebook, supra note 49.
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for a preliminary understanding of the basic legal landscape
surrounding UGC mega-sites and the people who use these sites. We
saw that each has specific features of interest. In Bragg, we saw that
while Second Life is a wildly popular site and one in which users are
allowed to create and own UGC, nevertheless, the case did not
involve UGC but instead virtual real estate that was created by Linden
Labs and then conveyed to Bragg. The case Chang v. Virgin Mobile
USA, LLC, involved UGC created by one of the plaintiffs, whose
content was inappropriately copied by one defendant, Virgin Mobile,
in part through the negligence of the other defendant, Creative
Commons. Finally, in Viacom v. YouTube, while the site is one of the
most popular UGC sites, nevertheless, the infringement action alleged
in the lawsuit involved copying of plaintiffs' complete commercial
works by YouTube and its users rather than the unauthorized copying
of plaintiffs' works that are regularly incorporated into UGC works
found on the site. While differing in their particulars, each of these
cases was informative regarding the overall set of relationships
between users and UGC-mega-sites.
We saw that of the three cases examined in Part II, Bragg v.
Linden Labs was the most significant in terms of illuminating a
particular issue-unconscionable contracts of adhesion between users
and the mega-sites-that appears likely to resonate more broadly on a
going-forward basis. In particular, we saw that there is a strong
argument for the conclusion that the hugely popular social networking
site, Facebook, is engaged in unconscionable, and thus by extension,
infringing behavior against literally millions of its users, and
moreover, its most vulnerable users, minors. Despite this massive
infringement, I argued that for public policy reasons, it made sense to
formulate the relationship in terms of an implied license. While some
of the present behavior of the site would likely be found intolerable,
yet an alternative way to go forward is possible, that would allow for
the tremendous social benefits provided by Facebook while avoiding
the massive unconscionable behavior that now accompanies the
provision of these social benefits.
* * *
